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Philosophy for AS and A Level: Epistemology and Moral Philosophy

Philosophy for AS and A Level: Epistemology and Moral Philosophy

Autorzy
Wydawnictwo Taylor & Francis Ltd
Data wydania 13/06/2017
Liczba stron 458
Forma publikacji książka w miękkiej oprawie
Poziom zaawansowania Literatura popularna
Język angielski
ISBN 9781138690394
Kategorie Filozofia: epistemologia i teoria wiedzy
232.05 PLN (z VAT)
$52.20 / €49.75 / £43.19 /
Produkt na zamówienie
Dostawa 3-4 tygodnie
Ilość
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Opis książki

Philosophy for AS and A Level is an accessible textbook for the new 2017 AQA Philosophy syllabus. Structured closely around the AQA specification this textbook covers the two units shared by the AS and A Level, Epistemology and Moral Philosophy, in an engaging and student-friendly way. With chapters on 'How to do philosophy', exam preparation providing students with the philosophical skills they need to succeed, and an extensive glossary to support understanding, this book is ideal for students studying philosophy.


Each chapter includes:








argument maps that help to develop student's analytical and critical skills







comprehension questions to test understanding







discussion questions to generate evaluative argument







explanation and commentary on the AQA set texts







'Thinking harder' sections







cross-references to help students make connections







bullet-point summaries of each topic.


The companion website hosts a wealth of further resources, including PowerPoint slides, flashcards, further reading, weblinks and handouts, all structured to accompany the textbook. It can be found at www.routledge.com/cw/alevelphilosophy. 'Michael Lacewing writes in an engaging way and really brings the A-Level philosophy syllabus to life; he focuses not only on the content but on the philosophical method itself. An essential read for any A-Level philosophy student'.
Cressida Tweed, teacher of philosophy at Woodhouse College and Lead philosophy tutor at the National Extension college, UK.

Philosophy for AS and A Level: Epistemology and Moral Philosophy

Spis treści

Contents











Permissions











Introduction











How to use this book





How to do philosophy





Following the syllabus





Additional features





Using the anthology





Glossary





Companion website and further resources





Acknowledgements











1 How to do philosophy





Philosophical argument





Deductive argument





Inductive argument





Hypothetical reasoning





Understanding arguments and argument maps





Evaluating arguments





Evaluating claims





An aside: why reason?





Fallacies





Reading philosophy





Approaching the text





Engaging with the text





Beyond the text





Writing philosophy





What you need to know





Planning an essay





Writing an essay





A standard essay structure





General advice











2 Epistemology





I. What is knowledge?





A. Knowledge and its definition





Types of knowledge





Propositional knowledge





The definition of knowledge





The purpose and nature of definition





Can propositional knowledge be defined?





Key points: knowledge and its definition











B. The tripartite view





The tripartite definition of knowledge





Why justified true belief?





Thinking harder: A note on certainty





Are the conditions individually necessary?





Justification is not a necessary condition of knowledge





Truth is not a necessary condition of knowledge





Belief is not a necessary condition of knowledge





Gettier's objection: are the conditions jointly sufficient?





Key points: the tripartite view











C. Responses





Add a 'no false lemmas' condition (J+T+B+N)





Infallibilism





Thinking harder: rejecting the argument for infallibilism





Reliabilism (R+T+B)





Truth and the third condition





Virtue epistemology (V+T+B)





Zagzebski's analysis of knowledge





Key points: Responses





Summary: What is knowledge?











II. Perception as a source of knowledge











A. Direct realism





The argument from perceptual variation





Responses





The argument from illusion





Thinking harder: the argument from hallucination





The disjunctive theory of perception





The time-lag argument





Thinking harder: direct realism and openness





Key points: direct realism











B. Indirect realism





What are sense-data?





Why indirect realism?





Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities





Scepticism about the existence of mind-independent objects





The existence of the external world is the best hypothesis





Two supporting arguments





Thinking harder: the existence of mind-independent objects is not a hypothesis





Representation, resemblance and the nature of physical objects





Berkeley's argument that mind-dependent ideas cannot be like mind-independent objects





Key points: indirect realism











C. Berkeley's idealism





Berkeley on primary and secondary qualities





Berkeley on secondary qualities





Berkeley's attack on the primary/secondary quality distinction





The immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects





Three arguments against mind-independent objects





Berkeley's 'master' argument





Idealism and God





Thinking harder: idealism and the cause of our perceptions





Issues with Berkeley's idealism





Problems with the role played by God in Berkeley's idealism





Arguments from illusion and hallucination





Idealism leads to solipsism





Key points: Berkeley's idealism





Summary: perception as a source of knowledge

















III. Reason as a source of knowledge





Rationalism, empiricism and innatism





A priori/a posteriori knowledge





Analytic/synthetic propositions





Necessary/contingent truth





Defining rationalism, empiricism and innatism





Key points: rationalism, empiricism and innatism











A. Innatism





Two arguments for innate knowledge





Plato's slave boy argument





Leibniz on knowledge of necessary truths





Locke's arguments against innate knowledge





Leibniz's response to Locke





Thinking harder: experience triggers innate knowledge





Alternative empiricist accounts





Locke's argument against innate concepts





Rejecting Locke's definition of 'innate concept'





Leibniz's defence of innate concepts





The mind as a 'tabula rasa'





Locke's two sources of concepts





Hume on impressions and ideas





Simple and complex concepts





Issues with the empiricist theory of concepts





Thinking harder: challenging the copy principle





Leibniz on 'intellectual ideas'





Thinking harder: the concept of substance





Discussion





Key points: innatism











B. The intuition and deduction thesis





Rationalism and empiricism revisited





The meaning of 'intuition' and 'deduction'





Empiricist alternatives





Hume's fork





Descartes' theory of rational intuition





The cogito





Clear and distinct ideas





Empiricist responses to the cogito





Clear and distinct ideas and God





Descartes' Trademark argument





Thinking harder: degrees of reality





Empiricist responses to the Trademark argument





Descartes' cosmological argument





Empiricist responses to Descartes' cosmological argument





Descartes' ontological argument





Empiricist responses to Descartes' ontological argument





Descartes' proof of the external world





The concept of a physical object





Thinking harder: The existence of physical objects





Empiricist responses to Descartes' proof of the external world





Key points: the intuition and deduction thesis





Summary: reason as a source of knowledge











IV. The limits of knowledge





A. Philosophical scepticism





The particular nature of philosophical scepticism





Am I a brain in a vat?





The distinction between philosophical scepticism and normal incredulity





Local and global scepticism





Descartes' sceptical arguments





Key points: philosophical scepticism











B. Responses to scepticism





Descartes' own response





Empiricist responses





Thinking harder: Direct realism





Thinking harder: Reliabilism





Key points: responses to scepticism





Summary: the limits of knowledge











3 Moral Philosophy





I. Normative ethical theories





A. Utilitarianism





Bentham's quantitative hedonistic utilitarianism





'The Principle of Utility'





'Measuring Pleasure and Pain'





Mill on utilitarianism





Mill's qualitative hedonistic utilitarianism





Is pleasure the only good?





Smart on hedonistic and non-hedonistic utilitarianism





Nozick's experience machine





Preference utilitarianism





Mill's 'proof' of utilitarianism





Stage 1: Happiness is good





Stage 2: Only happiness is good





Issues for (act) utilitarianism





Problems with calculation





Fairness, individual liberty and rights





Partiality





Moral integrity and the individual's intentions





Rule utilitarianism





Smart on rule utilitarianism





Rule utilitarianism developed





Objections





Key points: utilitarianism











B. Kantian deontological ethics





Deontology





Kant's account of the good will and duty





The good will





The distinction between acting in accordance with duty and acting out of duty





Thinking harder: The good will again





The categorical imperative





Hypothetical and categorical imperatives





Thinking harder: Contradiction in conception and contradiction in will





The second formulation of the Categorical Imperative





Issues for Kantian deontological ethics





Universalisability and morality





Conflicts between duties





The view that consequences of actions determine their moral value





Morality is a system of hypothetical imperatives





The value of certain motives





Key points: Kantian deontological ethics











C. Aristotelian virtue ethics





The good for human beings





Eudaimonia





Final ends





The function argument





Testing the analysis





Thinking harder: the rational 'soul'





Aristotle's account of virtues





Virtues as character traits





Virtues, the doctrine of the mean and the importance of feelings





The role of education in the development of a moral character





Practical wisdom





The role of practical wisdom





The relation between practical wisdom, virtue and action





Key points: Aristotelian virtue ethics (I)





Eudaimonia, pleasure and philosophy





Eudaimonia and pleasure





Eudaimonia and philosophy





Voluntary action, choice and moral responsibility





Voluntary and involuntary actions





Choice and deliberation





Thinking harder: moral responsibility





Justice





Issues for Aristotelian virtue ethics





Guidance on how to act





Conflicts between virtues





The possibility of circularity involved in defining virtuous acts and

virtuous people in terms of each other





Thinking harder: Virtue and eudaimonia





Key points: Aristotelian virtue ethics (II)





Summary: normative ethical theories











II. Applied ethics





Stealing





Utilitarianism





Kantian deontology





Aristotelian virtue ethics





Eating animals





Utilitarianism





Kantian deontology





Aristotle, Diamond and virtue ethics





Simulated killing





Playing the killer





An audience's perspective





Telling lies





Utilitarianism





Kantian deontology





Aristotelian virtue ethics





Key points: applied ethics





Summary: applied ethics











III. Metaethics





What is metaethics?





The origins of moral principles: reason, emotion/attitudes, or society





The distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism





Key points: The distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism











A. Moral realism





From cognitivism to moral realism





Moral naturalism





Utilitarianism as naturalism





Thinking harder: naturalism in virtue ethics





Moral non-naturalism: Moore's intuitionism





The naturalistic fallacy





The open question argument





Thinking harder: is the 'naturalistic fallacy' a real fallacy?





Intuitionism





Objections





Issues for moral realism





A J Ayer's verification principle





The argument from Hume's fork





Hume's argument from motivation





Hume's is-ought gap





Mackie's argument from relativity





Mackie's arguments from queerness





Key points: moral realism











B. Moral anti-realism





Error theory





Non-cognitivism and moral anti-realism





Emotivism





Emotivism and subjectivism





Ayer's defence





Emotivism after Ayer





Prescriptivism





Prescriptive meaning





Good





Moral language





Issues for moral anti-realism





Can moral anti-realism account for how we use moral language?





Thinking harder: disagreement and moral argument





Whether moral anti-realism becomes moral nihilism





Moral progress





Key points: moral anti-realism











Metaethics and applied ethics





Summary: metaethics











4 Preparing for the exam





The examination





The structure of the exam





Assessment objectives





Understanding the question: giving the examiners what they are looking for





Short-answer questions





Nine-mark questions





Fifteen-mark questions





Revision: it's more than memory





Exam technique: getting the best result you can





Revision tips





Exam tips











Glossary (with Joanne Lovesey)











Index by syllabus content





Subject index

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